ANNEX III: European policy analysis

This chapter has as objective to identify the major trends in public policy development at European level aimed at countering violent “radicalisation”. We could argue, for the purpose of terminological clarity, that “radicalisation” refers to the process of having increasingly radical thoughts and that “violent radicalisation” includes the willingness to engage in violence before any violence has taken place. Ponsaers et al. (2010) here use the terms “radicalism” and “extremism” to refer to these first stages of the process (although they acknowledge that these terms may be misleading as they seem to suggest a static situation). A third stage is “terrorism”. This distinction is of course not always clear-cut. Research suggests that there is a certain tipping point in the process of radicalisation after which the radicalised person has severed all ties with society in general and family and friends in particular (Leman, 2016). Some also argue that the discourse of “radicalisation” is invented, allowing governments to engage in counter-terrorism pre-emptively, i.e. before any actual terrorism (or violence) has taken place (Heath-Kelly, 2012). On this topic, Christmann (2012: 1) comments that most research on “radicalisation” focuses on “terrorism”. As such, that research has in mind a group of radicalised persons who go on to commit acts of violence, instead of a much broader group of people with radical ideas. “This introduces a systematic bias in the literature, away from the radicalisation process that precedes terrorism, including radicalisation that does not lead to violence.” Such a bias renders certain groups or communities suspicious.

In the following, considering the objectives of the CONRAD project and the lack of a universal definition, the focus is placed on the concept of “violent radicalisation” (Khosrokavar 2014): « Par “radicalisation”, on désigne le processus par lequel un individu ou un groupe adopte une forme violente d’action, directement liée à une idéologie extrémiste à contenu politique, social ou religieux qui conteste l’ordre établi sur le plan politique, social ou culturel »

The scope of this report: prevention of “radicalisation”

Considering this, the focus in this paper is on understanding the recent policy-developments at European level. We set out to explore the policy-objectives defined by European public actors, their historical background, as well as their mode of implementation. In other words, this paper seeks to provide a sociological understanding of the genesis of anti-“radicalisation” policies with a specific focus on prevention. Our analysis of prevention policies was not a deliberate choice, but rather an inevitable choice regarding the way the European documents apprehend the fight against “radicalisation”. In the different documents and communications of the European institutions, we focused on the ones which were talking of “fighting radicalisation” and not of “fighting terrorism”, even if both are closely related, especially in the older documents. It seems, throughout these documents, that the fight against “radicalisation” is greatly implemented through prevention and that repression is reserved for terrorism. Already in 2005, one of the four pillars of the EU counter-terrorism strategy is prevention and the term “radicalisation” is only found in this part of the document. Furthermore, the fight against “radicalisation” can take place by either preventing “radicalisation” before it happens or by implementing measures of “de-radicalisation” or
“disengagement” when “radicalisation” has occurred. It seems in the documents that the repressive measures are not really seen as a way to "de-radicalise" someone. The few repressive measures spotted do not target the ideology but rather the spread of it, for example: attacking online propaganda and limiting access to some online contents, and dismantling recruiters’ networks. The other way around, in “preventive” government initiatives such as the British PREVENT programme frontline workers such as doctors or social workers are asked to notify the authorities in case they have had contact with someone with alleged radical thoughts (Awan, 2012; Richards, 2011).

We can suggest that the greater representativeness of prevention in the “fighting radicalisation” documents reflects the idea that “radicalisation” is a process which happens in the mind of the individuals and that it is not possible or more difficult to tackle ideas by punishing someone. However, we will see in this report that repression and reintegration can come to complete preventive measures. Even if the efforts are mainly put on prevention, repressive and reintegrative measures are sometimes developed along preventive measures to reinforce the system of the fight against “radicalisation”.

The field of action for public authorities in relation to violent “radicalisation” is quite broad. It encompasses anti-terrorist and intelligence activities as well as prevention and programmes relating to the improvement of intercultural and social cohesion. We are mostly concerned in this document with prevention activities. As we will see prevention activities may themselves be subdivided into different kind of subcategories including primary, secondary and tertiary prevention.

The prevention of “radicalisation” is generally presented on the basis of an analogy with the medical model of prevention. Many actors use a typology distinguishing primary prevention (or universal), secondary prevention (or selective) and tertiary prevention (or indicated). These types of approaches correspond to evolving positions on a scale of risks. Preventing “radicalisation” requires taking action at the three moments. Primary prevention work is required for raising awareness for instance through schools and social work. When more important vulnerabilities are identified, a secondary prevention work will be necessary. Then, a tertiary prevention work needs to be implemented when “radicalisation” has entered a phase when it may end up in behaviours leading to violent extremism or terrorism.

One of the major difficulties when talking about the prevention of violent “radicalisation” is the difficulty to establish valid and reliable typologies of actors and phenomena. The phenomenon is not homogeneous. Although the focus of public attention is currently on Jihadi “radicalisation”, there are many other forms which call similarly for the attention of policy-makers (far-right extremism, separatist movements, animal rights, hooliganism, etc). In a similar vein, the actors are diverse. The burgeoning literature on jihadi radicals shows there is no simple typology of perpetrators of violence. Some have grown up in a strict religious environment, others in moderate ones while yet others had no previous religious socialisation. Classical structural determinants have a poorly explanatory power when it comes to jihadi engagement (Crétiez 2011). This cognitive uncertainty makes violent “radicalisation” a relatively unpredictable phenomenon.

Although “radicalisation” remains complex and insufficiently understood, European policymakers have developed a range of policy-response. On the basis of a European survey of
policies in the field, Vidino and Brandon (2012) argue that there are three large macro-families of activities and approaches:

- **General preventive measures**: the aim is to counter radical ideas through promoting tolerant and democratic values and principles.
  The former are initiatives aimed at challenging extremist ideas and influences in society, promoting tolerant, moderate and democratic principles, and addressing factors that can increase vulnerability to radicalisation. They are preventive programs that target at-risk segments of society (mostly Muslim youth), seeking to make them resilient to radical ideas, or the population at large, aiming to reduce intra-societal tensions. (Vidino and Brandon, 2012: 164)

- **Outreach/engagement measures**: these initiatives aim to improve communication and build trust between authorities and communities.

- **Individual interventions**: the aim is “rehabilitate” people who appear to be radicalising to violence.
  These initiatives seek to target individuals who, while displaying obvious signs of radicalisation, have not yet fully embraced jihadist ideology or committed criminal acts. (Vidino and Brandon, 2012: 168)

A sociology of European anti-“radicalisation” public policies has among others as objective to identify the nature of the actors involved, the type of knowledge and the kind of framing inherent to their action, the level of coordination among policy actors, etc. Therefore, these are some of the questions that we set out to explore: who is active at developing European-wide public policies? What are their underlying philosophies? How do they define the problem of violent “radicalisation” and what are the policy-tools implemented at European level? Is there convergence or divergence in European public policy approaches?

Nation States are the most directly concerned and legally competent for combatting terrorism and violent “radicalisation”. But instead of looking at the initiatives taken at the level of each single EU member State, we propose to focus here on projects developed at both intergovernmental and harmonised EU level. This is not an either/or choice as European policies have precisely as objective to support the initiatives of its constituent members. Within the EU, the strategy primarily and explicitly supports member states: “While it recognised that actions against “radicalisation” fall primarily within the competences and responsibilities of Member States, the EU Strategy on “radicalisation” stressed the importance and added value of an EU framework for Member States to coordinate their policies, share information, determine good practices and develop new ideas” (EC, Preventing radicalisation, 1).

As we will show, local authorities in general and cities in particular are also increasingly led to take-up the challenge of addressing violent “radicalisation” and they often do it hand in hand with civil society organisation. It is important to note here that, probably on all levels of policy, but also at the European level, political initiatives and documents often name rather distinct phenomena such as terrorism and “radicalisation” in one and the same approach. This is of course problematic, because such a conflation contributes to the simplification and framing of a complex phenomenon. It runs the risk of making all forms of radical thought, protest and anger by particular ‘subordinate’ groups suspicious in the eyes of the public.
For the purpose of exhaustiveness we also include some of these initiatives in the overview that are in essence more directly linked to anti-terrorism but which have an importance for the study of policy regarding “radicalisation”. Of course, when studying the institutional and political context in which “radicalisation” takes place, anti-terrorism discourses, programmes and policies are also relevant.

**European intergovernmental coordination**

The Council of Europe is a 47 Member States organisation, including the 28 EU Member States. It plays a leading role in terms of promoting Human Rights through a series of Convention such as the well-known European Convention on Human Rights. The Council of Europe has stimulated both intergovernmental and interparliamentary reflections and actions on terrorism and the prevention of violent “radicalisation.”

In 2015, the Council of Europe set a plan of action (2015-2017) to fight violent extremism and "radicalisation". The objectives of the plan were twofold:

1. To reinforce the legal framework concerning terrorism and violent extremism.
2. To prevent and fight “radicalisation” through targeted actions in the public sector and on the Internet.

In March 2016, the Council of Europe held a Committee of Ministers on “radicalisation” and the increase of extremism. This debate was fed by contributions of 22 International NGOs. At the end of 2016, the Council of Europe issued a “Guide to prevent radicalisation in prison”. The objective to explicitly target prisons stems from the insight that prisons often serve as places to recruit and radicalise other detainees. After adopting the “Guidelines for prison and probation services regarding radicalisation and violent extremism” in 2016, the Council decided to draft a Guide aimed at the administrators and the staff of penitentiary and probation services, but also to any professional who works with offenders likely to radicalise in prison. In these guidelines, the Council of Europe promotes the good management of penal institutions in order to fight efficiently the process of “radicalisation”. For example, a good communication between prison guards and detainees, or also taking into account cultural traditions of detainees are seen as central.

This Guide first details what is violent extremism and how it can develop in prison. It also reviews the different ways of addressing the evaluation of the risks linked to extremist offenders. Moreover, it explains the possibilities of social reintegration and the taking of responsibility for violent extremist detainees. The questions of security and safety within the institution are also tackled. Finally, it focuses on the importance of families and couples in the evolution of extremist detainees.

In March 2017, the Council of Europe published new recommendations on sanctions and applied measures in the community and the prevention of “radicalisation” in prisons. When talking about sanctions and measures, the Council means sanctions or measures which maintain the accused within society with some restrictions on liberty. These new rules try to promote social reintegration of the individual. While encouraging this type of sanction, the Council however warns that they must be proportional to the tort and to the offender’s profile. This is a good example of how repressive measures can be combined with reintegration measures in order to prevent recidivism.
The Committee of Ministers has also taken into account the guideline for the penitentiary services regarding “radicalisation” and violent extremism. This guideline deals with questions such as risk assessment methods; the regime and the treatment of “radicalised” people; implications in terms of safety for detainees and the staff; and the way of working with families, social relations and communities of offenders.

The Congress of Local and Regional Authorities of the Council of Europe

The Congress of Local and Regional Authorities of the Council of Europe, in which local and regional governments of the 47 members of the Council of Europe are represented, adopted a resolution in 2015 concerning the actions and strategies to undertake at the local level to prevent “radicalisation” and hate demonstration. Here, the attacks of Paris and Copenhagen aroused the will to act at the local level. As in the case of some other decisions, it is often an attack or an event which pushes policy makers to act. It is also in this resolution, along with the RAN network (see below), that we can find most links made with the local level.

The objective was to establish guidelines for local authorities regarding the prevention of “radicalisation”. Relevance of long term and local (private and public institutions and civil society) actions are underlined to tackle this phenomenon. In order to do so, the Congress called for several measures:

- Intersectional strategies which allow the different levels of power to collaborate.
- To promote an inclusive discourse without stigmatisation while maintaining the respect of Human Rights.
- To organise education for professionals who are affected by this issue.
- To allow cities to cope better with “radicalisation” in organising exchanges and reunions between European cities on the topic.
- To reinforce youth education within their families as well as their schools.
- To promote partnerships with civil society.
- To promote and support programs of disengagement.
- To allow a better financial stability for the professional dealing with “radicalisation”.
- To ensure a transparent financing when granting funds to associations.
- To enlarge collaboration with international organisms.
- To evaluate regularly member states actions in this field.

These measures are ambitious and take into account the fact that “radicalism” has to be fought first of all at the local level by concrete measures on the long term. What is remarkable is that the measures formulated in this resolution emphasise the role of many actors (public, private, civil society) in tackling the phenomenon of “radicalisation”, the importance of collaboration and of education, while stressing the importance of an inclusive discourse and the danger of stigmatisation.

Through these measures, we can see that collaboration between the different levels of power is central: between the national and international level and between public and private partners. The wish to make them sustainable in the long run is translated by the will to stabilise and perpetuate the allocated funds. However, the fight against “radicalisation” on the field is not explained in detail. Indeed, the text rests on 3 pillars: sensitisation, synergies within the Council of Europe and synergies with outside institutions.
In this text as well, it becomes clear that defining “radicalisation” is a difficult task, emphasising that it is a process which varies for each person. The reasons that push an individual to “radicalise” are not clearly explained but, interestingly, a reference is made to a lack of integration in society (which is not necessarily backed by the existing scientific insight in the matter). In order to counter the phenomenon, it is argued that direct action in the affected communities is required but the accent is put on an intense collaboration between the different levels of power and field actors/practitioners. According to this text, the success of the fight depends heavily on the measures taken on the local level, since “radicalisation” should be seen as a phenomenon rooted in particular social ecologies.

European Forum for Urban Security

This Forum, created 30 years ago, consists of representatives of more than 250 cities and regions from 16 countries. Its main objective is to support local authorities in the implementation of their local security policy. They are part of the RAN and have created, in partnership with the Congress, the Alliance of European Cities against Violent Extremism which is conceived as an exchange platform between local authorities following the resolution taken by the Congress of Local and Regional Authorities (see above). They especially developed the LIAISE project (Local Institutions Against Extremism) along with several European cities. This project was meant to assist cities in the implementation of their strategies against “radicalisation”; each city was then supported according to its particular context. This project was also meant to develop some videos and a guide for local authorities. The LIAISE II Project being launched at the moment and will allow the dissemination of the lessons learned in the initial project to a greater number of cities. For 30 years, the European Forum for Urban Security has led or participated in more than a dozen projects on the issue of “radicalisation” and has established long-term or one-off partnerships with major players in the prevention of radicalisation (Radicalisation Awareness Network - RAN -, Strong Cities Network, etc). The network has published analyses and guidebooks, including Prevention of violent radicalisation – Methodological guide for the development of a local strategy (2017) and Preventing and Fighting Radicalisation at the Local Level (2016).

European Union strategies

In the early years of terrorism and radicalisation policy on the EU level (after 11 September 2001), the fight against terrorism takes priority over the fight against “radicalisation”. That is why the “prevention” section only represents an item among others more targeted on security and protection. It is only after the attacks in Madrid and London that it gradually becomes clear that terrorists are often home-grown and not foreign. As a result, the EU realises it should focus more on the process of “radicalisation”. This probably also explains why some documents, especially early policy documents, do not do the effort of defining “radicalisation.” At the moment, it is possible to find a slight definition of the phenomenon on their website, explained through terrorism without any further explanations: “Radicalisation is understood as a complex phenomenon of people embracing radical ideology that could lead to the commitment of terrorist acts”. Considering the fact that Madrid (2005) and London (2006)
happened more than 10 years ago we can be critical as to the lack of understanding that we still have on the topic and the lack of terminological clarity in policy documents. Together with this evolution is a growing understanding that a wide array of prevention initiatives and programmes is necessary to address the problem. For instance, in the 2014 revised EU anti-terrorism strategy the emphasis is put on (1) fighting inequalities and discrimination, promoting intercultural dialogue and strengthening education, (2) promoting moderate discourses and dialogues in the media and on social networks, (3) improving governmental communication explaining policy decisions in order to avoid extremist responses, (4) supporting dissuasive discourses, (5) investing in the work and training of first-line practitioners, and (6) actively involving civil society.

It is remarkable to see that this type of moderate, preventive discourse has gained the upper hand on the EU level, whereas in many Member States the dominant tone is (or is becoming) that of populist and right-wing approaches on foreign terrorist fighters, “radicalisation”, migration and the refugee crisis, and the so-called incompatibility of Islam and the Western way of life. Here the EU wishes to promote a sober and positive discourse, human rights, education, socio-economic prosperity and intercultural dialogue.

It is also important to note that, by supporting strategic programs such as EXIT-Germany and EXIT-Sweden (programmes that originally only worked with right-wing extremists), and by valorising their working methodology, the EU in effect endorses a position that considers jihadist or religious extremism as only one of many possible forms of extremism.

From an EU anti-terrorism to an anti-“radicalisation” strategy (2004-2014)

“Radicalisation” and terrorism were put on the European agenda during the European Council of 15 and 16 March 2004, immediately after the attacks in Madrid, when a decision was made to install an EU terrorism coordinator. Some countries have afterwards installed such a coordinator on a national level. In 2005 the Council adopted the European Union counter-terrorism strategy, consisting of four pillars: prevention, protection, prosecution and reaction.

Three general lines of action are developed in this document:

- Implementing common approaches in order to detect and prevent radical behaviour and developing a legislation recognising as tortuous the recruitment behaviour, especially in penitentiaries or places of worship.
- Implementing a sober communication strategy in order to improve the knowledge of European policies and to promote an intercultural dialogue.
- Implementing assistance programs to improve security, justice and the possibility to have a serene socio-economic future for all.

The pursuit of research in terms of combating “radicalisation” is also mentioned.

While recognising that each member state is responsible for combating “radicalisation”, the strategy contains concrete measures to be implemented at a European level. Those measures divided in 3 lines of action, require cooperation between the Council and the Commission.

This strategy was revised in 2008. This revision was done to specifically implement measures against the funding of terrorism. The recommendations especially concern prevention of terrorism through the financial sector; the question of “radicalisation” is not
addressed. On 18 November 2011 an agreement was made with the US about the transfer of bank details, the so-called SWIFT agreement, which was developed as an anti-terrorism tool.

The European Parliament adopted a resolution in November 2015 on “Prevention of radicalisation and recruitment of European citizens by Terrorist organisations” (2015/2063(INI)). In this resolution, the Parliament comes to talk about “radicalisation” in those terms: “it has become a term used to describe the phenomenon of people embracing intolerant opinions, views and ideas which could lead to violent extremism” (P8_TA(2015)0410, p.3). The first words “it has become a term used to describe …” of the sentence indicate that the Parliament does not consider this definition as its own, but rather used by several institution as a reference definition. However, even if this definition is getting close to the one used in the communication of the European Commission in 2005, for example, they are not totally the same. While earlier EU definitions leaned heavily on the notion of “extremism”, in order to evoke the central role of “extreme” opinions, this definition foregrounds “intolerance” as the touching stone of “radicalisation” (while identifying “extremism” as the final stage of the process).

In this resolution, the European Parliament recommends to implement and evaluate the EU Strategy against “radicalisation” and the recruitment of terrorists. They also advise member states to exchange good practices, especially concerning the management of prisons and their staff. They then discuss the issue of Internet and the gain a removal of online hate speech strategy could bring. The dissemination of a positive discourse is encouraged as well as projects intended to educate young people on that topic. Afterwards, they underline the importance of school and wish to integrate education programs concerning the use of internet. They invite for a better dialogue with minorities, especially with religious communities. They reassert the importance of a good collaboration between member states, European institutions and civil society. They also question the issue of a setting up a family support system. The end of the document concentrates more on the prevention and repression of terrorism through intelligence services, internal and external security, borders control, financial control, etc. Even if those measures are rather abstract, the European Parliament however addresses the issue of “deradicalisation” and proposes to hire assistants or advisors to help people to disengage from a “radical” pathway. They also mention their wish to launch a communication campaign on former foreign fighters. This proposition had to be underlined as one of the most concrete propositions in the field of preventing “radicalisation”.

**Policy-principles of the EU Strategy On Radicalisation**

The EU Strategy for Combating Radicalisation and Recruitment (‘EU Strategy on radicalisation’, adopted in 2005, and revised in 2008 and 2014), is part of the broader EU Counter Terrorism Strategy of 2005. It lays the foundations for an enhanced involvement of civil society in tackling and countering “radicalisation”. One of the four pillars of this strategy, as mentioned above, is the prevention of “radicalisation”. In the “radicalisation” pillar, the accent is put on how to oppose the desire and willingness to commit terrorist attacks. In this first definition of a European strategy, the members states, at their level, are expected to implement strategies to fight “radicalisation” even it is fundamental that each country, even
outside Europe, may do the same with the hope to actually and efficiently counter “radicalisation”.

In 2014, the anti-terrorism strategy of the Council of the European Union was revised again, this time with the accent laid on the fight against “radicalisation” and the recruitment of terrorists. Once again, it was emphasised that it is the responsibility of the member states to fight “radicalisation”. Indeed, “radicalisation” primarily comes up on national territories. However, to fight “radicalisation”, cooperation between the local, regional, federal, European and international levels is needed. In this policy revision, 10 measures are adopted:

A. Fighting against inequalities and discrimination, promoting an intercultural dialogue and strengthening education. Concerning the countries outside the EU, working on the good management, human rights, education, etc.

B. Promoting moderate discourses and dialogues in the media and on social networks. Keep adopting a sober discourse to speak about those questions as well.

C. Improving governmental communication to explain policy decision and avoid extremist discourses. The objective is also to attack online “radicalisation” and in order to do so, create a public-private partnership.

D. Supporting dissuasive discourses, especially sustaining the local level to create projects with the field workers. Keep working on those discourses with the victims of terrorism and potentially with some former terrorists.

E. Fighting against online “radicalisation”; disrupting the actions of recruiters but also fighting against terrorist discourses.

F. Training first-line practitioners who are more capable of detecting early “radicalisation”. The CEPOL would organize those formations.

G. Involving actively civil society and the private sector in the fight against radicalism. In order to do so, sufficient resources have to be given to civil society.

H. Implementing strategies of disengagement adapted to the context.

I. Keeping on the research work on the subject.

J. Because interior and international terrorism are linked, it is necessary to coordinate internal and external actions and so, to cooperate with third countries.

The issue of Internet and more broadly of globalisation is evoked to explain the difficulty to grasp how recruitment and the process of “radicalisation” takes place. Here, both the local police and first-line practitioners are considered important for detecting “radicalisation”. Initiatives are also taken to implement a legislation on “radicalisation” and recruitment in prisons and in places of worship.

What is remarkable in the policy principles of the EU is that (1) it wishes to promote a sober and positive discourse, promoting human rights, education, socio-economic prosperity and intercultural dialogue, (2) the EU is not only concerned with jihadist extremism but also focuses on other forms of extremism, (3) it stresses the importance of a multi-partner approach, but nonetheless (4) does not take into account the complex social reality that underlies a phenomenon such as “radicalisation”. By adopting a rather mechanical approach to tackle the phenomenon (e.g. through detection and disengagement, or by focusing on recruitment, the Internet and counternarratives) it denies the scientific consensus that there is no single form of “radicalisation” and no linear process, and it denies the social circumstances that made someone “radicalisable”.
In 2015, the European Commission launches the “Union Forum” against online propaganda, which is a platform for ministers and CEOs of the private sector (Google, YouTube, etc.) in order to reduce the access to terrorist contents as well as to counter those discourses.

In that same year, the SSCAT (Syrian Strategic Communication Advisory Team) led by Belgium is created. This team has the objective to enable the development and the exchange of good practices in terms of strategic communication to fight against violent extremism and “radicalisation”, in order to discourage citizens to leave for Syria or other terrorists areas.

In May 2016, a code of conduct to remove illegal online hatred discourses is signed by the companies of the computer industry. The code asks the companies to settle procedures within their structures as well as formation for the staff to attempt to counter hatred and illegal contents by analysing and blocking them.

The communication of June 2016 (European Commission, Document COM(2016) 379) explains the contribution the EU can bring to the member states in 7 fields in connection with the prevention of "radicalisation":

A. Supporting research.

“Radicalisation” is based on recruitment techniques which can have an effect beyond borders. Several projects have been launched by means of the “seventh frame program”.

A “Horizon 2020” program is launched by the Commission, which is to benefit the Member States directly in their fight against “radicalisation”.

The RAN Center of Excellence is created to exchange good practices.

B. The fight against online propaganda.

It is admitted that material devices and technologies are not direct causes, but they can accelerate the process of “radicalisation”. Against that, the “Union forum” was created in December 2015 to study the different ways of attacking online propaganda. It is composed of member states, police and intelligence services, civil society and concerned companies (Facebook, Google, etc.). The objective is to limit the access to certain online contents and to fight against “radicalisation” with counter-narratives. The Commission also works with Facebook, Twitter, Youtube and Microsoft to establish a code of online conduct.

The “Service of audiovisual media” directive: in the revision, the Commission wishes that the platforms take appropriate measures to protect citizens from incitement to hatred discourses.

“Internet safer”: allows “internet safer” national centers to sensitise children and parents to online dangers.

C. The fight in prisons against “radicalisation”:

Eurojust follows the evolution of the legislative framework in the member states in terms of “radicalisation”. Eurojust helps the member states to combat severe forms of criminality which play a role in two or more EU countries. It also keeps track of the evolution of the legislative framework in the member states in terms of “radicalisation”. Finally, it facilitates the exchange of information between procurators.
The Commission has allocated 8 million to reintegration programs. Two structures have been set up by the Commission:
The confederation of European Probation and European Organization of Prison and Correctional Services (EUROPRIS) to associate the formation of the penitentiary staff and the probation officers.
The European Judicial Training Network which is currently working on a formation program on "radicalisation" for the judges and procurators.
The RAN has created a working group "Prison and probation" for professionals of prisons; it is an exchange of good practices.

D. Promoting an education accessible to everyone.
The reinforcement of the access to education is seen as a rampart against “radicalisation”. The Commission wishes to create a network to allow civil society actors to share their experiences in schools.
ETwinning was created to put teachers in touch throughout Europe. RAN also participates in this.

E. Promoting an inclusive society.
This action aims at eliminating discrimination and connecting young people to the job market.

F. The security dimension.
Sharing information is necessary to manage borders, especially to notify member states of the suspected “radicalised” persons.
The Schengen Information System enables a rapid exchange of information on people suspected of terrorist activities between the intelligence services, and border control. With a reporting through this system, a person can be arrested and controlled. This can impeach movements or identify pathways.
Within Europol (a central data repertory containing known terrorists or assumed terrorists) the ECTC was created to facilitate cooperation between state members.

G. International dimension
In dealing with third countries, the Commission will engage in guarding the respect for Human rights. The Commission participates mainly in preventive actions. It cooperates with the UN, the Council and the OSCE. It cooperates with police forces of third countries and dialogues to elaborate measures. "The revised European neighborhood policy“ privileges youth, education and socioeconomic development.
The STRIVE is a set of measures which allows to implement diverse initiatives. The RAN and Etwinning will also intervene to exchange knowledge with third countries.
Remarkably, this 2016 communication speaks of “7 fields in prevention of radicalisation”, but in fact only two of those can be called “prevention” in the usual sense of the word: (1) promoting accessible education and (2) promoting an inclusive society (through the job market, anti-discrimination regulation, ….). The other priorities (related to supporting research, online (counter-)narratives, prisons, security measures, and collaboration with non-EU countries) are usually not considered “prevention” work.
In January 2017, the Commission adopts a communication “Preventing radicalisation to terrorism and violent extremism: strengthening the EU’s response”. This document lists 10 areas in which the member states and the Commission could strengthen their future actions. This document also considers transmitting the accumulated expertise of the RAN to the member states. The Commission supports the fight against “radicalisation” especially through:

- A funding national programmes by means of the FSI (monetary fund for internal security).
- A funding for the “Erasmus +” program which promotes education.
- The structural investment of European funds in social inclusion, education, socio-educative youth work. It wishes to implement a tool box for educators and animators which will allow them to get in touch with marginalised young. The Commission also intends to continue its action with the European Voluntary Service.

**Actors and actions**

**European economic and social committee**

The European Economic and Social Committee is composed of 350 consultants representing civil society aiming at offering advice to different EU governing bodies. They regularly publish “opinions” on social and economic fields. Two opinions are relevant here: the opinion on “Prevention of terrorism and violent “radicalisation”” from 2008 and the opinion on “Cooperation with civil society in order to prevent “radicalisation” of young people” from 2017.

In the opinion of 2008, the issue of the definition of new concepts such as violent “radicalisation” is addressed. Taking the initial definition in the 2002 framework decision concerning the fight against terrorism and the Burgess report to the European Parliament, the text argues that “the definitional challenge related to violent radicalisation and its prevention is that of intention”. In other words, the document argues that the real difficulty for policy-makers lies in identifying the “intention” of “radicalised” people, e.g. to what extent are we certain that “radicalisation” is a cognitive and rational process? “Moreover, radicalisation is often a process that can extend over time, years even, meaning that there is time for dialogue, education and information procedures and other preventive measures” (EESC, p.62). While the text intends to tackle the issue of the prevention of violent “radicalisation”, they seem more concerned with terrorism and address questions such as surveillance of financial flows, border control, communication on Internet, intelligence services, etc. The role of civil society is discussed and propositions are made. The text insists on the preponderant position civil society has in the fight against terrorism and the support of victims. They wish for a better communication and collaboration with national and community actors, especially with communities “in which terrorist groups base themselves” (EESC, p.64). The concern is much more placed on terrorism than violent “radicalisation”, certainly due to the international context of that time. At the same time, the document connects “radicalisation” with (lack of) integration, exclusion and inequalities, which should be tackled in order to prevent an individual to “radicalise”. They then want to foster education, create a code of conduct addressed to media, promote positive discourses, etc. Even if those recommendations are situated in a prevention framework, the concern is still terrorism.
In the second opinion from 2017, the emphasis is much more put on preventing “radicalisation” than in 2008. “Radicalisation” is defined as: “a process through which individuals or groups become extremists eventually using, promoting or advocating violence for their aims. Radicalisation leading to violent extremism is a specific process not to be confounded with political radicalism or non-violent radical ideas or actions or legitimate democratic opposition.” (EESC, p.5). Here, the term radicalisation is directly defined in relation to the word “violent”, distinct from any kind of radical ideas which do not use violence to achieve its objectives. “Radicalisation” in this understanding needs to be prevented because it leads to violence and illegal actions. The word “extremism”, on the other hand, covers numerous forms of interpretation and requires caution.

In terms of proposed measures, what stands out is that it focuses on promoting education, reinforcing the role of families, fighting unemployment and poverty, in the EU as well as in the third countries. The text also mentions the role of media in the fight against online hate speech and positive practices in prison and social reintegration in society for condemned individuals. To bring Vidino and Brandon’s (2012) distinction in mind: the brief focuses on the three levels of prevention work, with an adherence to resilience and long-term policies. The advice formulated in these two briefs clearly shows that the EU policy landscape has shifted from anti-terrorism measures, with only a limited attention to prevention, to broad anti-“radicalisation” policies, including a focus on integration, multiculturalism and social cohesion.

Committee of the Regions
The Committee of the Regions is composed of the different local and regional representatives of the EU member states. It consists of 350 members who offer advice on issues that have repercussions on the local level. In 2017, the brief “Combatting “radicalisation” and violent extremism: prevention mechanisms at Local and Regional level” was published.

The text underlines the lack of an EU consensus on the definition of “radicalisation” and calls for more attention to this. The section reserved for the definition of the term cites: “in the absence of a commonly accepted definition of ‘violent radicalisation’, defines ‘radicalisation’ as a phenomenon of people who regard the use of violence as legitimate and/or use violence themselves in order to achieve their political objectives which undermine the democratic legal order and the fundamental rights on which it is based” (CoR, 2017: 17). Here, “radicalisation” is still linked to violent actions, but it is much more explicitly related to political ideas, an emphasis we do not find in the other EU documents. Moreover, the text underlines that violent “radicalisation” is a complex phenomenon which encompasses several fields and domains and that it can affect any individual. Feelings of exclusion and loss of identity are identified as important factors in the process of “radicalisation”. Furthermore, the document argues that discrimination, racism and unemployment should be tackled, while enhancing respect of fundamental rights. Education, positive discourses, support of families, better integration of migrants and accompanying measures for people leaving prisons are also identified as ways to prevent “radicalisation”.

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The Radicalisation Awareness Network (RAN)

Although fighting “radicalisation” is primarily a competence of the Member States, a European framework to guide and support was put in place. The EU feels that the combat against “radicalisation” has to be done in collaboration in order to get some results. With the sharp increase of communication and international travelling in the global era, a whole series of actors are involved in the phenomenon. As the main vehicle of policy, the European Commission created the RAN (Radicalisation Awareness Network) in 2011 to help local structures in the fight of “radicalisation”. Today, the RAN consists of more than 700 organisations from the different member states. In total, it consists of more than 2400 frontline professionals. It is a platform that enables exchange of experiences, knowledge and good practices. Its missions are threefold:

- Reinforcing exchanges between concerned actors both inside and outside the EU.
- Supporting the EU and the member states undertaking preventive actions.
- Consolidating and sharing the expertise in the network.

According to their website: “RAN is a network of frontline or grassroots practitioners from around Europe who work daily with people who have already been “radicalised”, or who are vulnerable to “radicalisation”. Practitioners include police and prison authorities, but also those who are not traditionally involved in counter-terrorism activities, such as teachers, youth workers, civil society representatives, local authorities representatives and healthcare professionals.”

The RAN has nine Working Groups:

A. Communications and Narratives
B. Education
C. EXIT
D. Youth, Families and Communities
E. Local Authorities
F. Prison and Probation
G. Police and Law Enforcement
H. Remembrance of Victims of Terrorism
I. Health and Social Care

According to the RAN website, “in RAN Working Groups, frontline practitioners may share their extensive knowledge and first-hand experience with one another, and peer review each other’s practices. RAN is also a platform for the world of practitioners, researchers and policy makers to pool expertise and experience to tackle “radicalisation”.” For this purpose, the RAN implemented different approaches along seven axes: community engagement and empowerment, multi-agency approach, counter- or alternative narratives, educating young people, exit strategies, family support and training for first-line practitioners.

European Network of De-radicalisation

The European Network of De-radicalisation (ENoD) is an interactive platform of NGO-practitioners who engage in face-to-face “de-radicalisation” or EXIT-work. The project is led by the Violence Prevention Network (Berlin), a not-for-profit organisation of academics and professional first-line practitioners who combine practical experience and
social research expertise. The network, which started in January 2012, is closely connected with the RAN. It is set up with the assumption that community and grassroots organisations, as well as social entrepreneurs and not-for-profit, non-governmental organisations (NGOs) are essential for preventing polarisation and violence and for intervening in emerging conflicts. Practitioners from NGOs often are probably better positioned to access even the most vulnerable environments and penetrate the culture and language of (ex-) offenders, their followers and their social environments. Working largely independently from government institutions these practitioners are also well positioned to build relationships of respect and mutual trust, which are indispensable for successful “de-radicalisation” work.

The exchange of information in the ENoD pertains to methodologies used, target groups, good practice criteria, challenges, needs and institutional standing and support in the respective member states. The network’s future activities may also encompass cross-training and capacity building among facilitators from different fields and countries, thus generating added-value at European level.

The first ENoD conference, which took place from the 31st of October until the 1st of November 2013, was attended by 26 organisations from 14 Member States. Through joint effort and extensive collaboration the European Network of De-radicalisation was officially inaugurated on the 1st of November 2013.

High-Level Commission Expert Group on Radicalisation

The European Commission has settled an Expert Group on Radicalisation in July 2017 in order to advise, develop and foster collaboration between member states and to work on preventive policies. It is composed of EU Member States, the European Commission and relevant EU services, institutions and agencies (Europol, Eurojust, the Fundamental Rights Agency "FRA", CEPOL), the Radicalisation Awareness Network (RAN) Centre of Excellence as well as the EEAS and the EU Counter Terrorism Coordinator. Because this Expert Group is quite new, the document analysed here only reflects the first meetings of the last trimester of 2017. They have identified priority areas in which implementing actions:

A. Prison, probation and rehabilitation: they call for exchange of good practices between the Commission and member states. The implementation of formation for workers in penitentiaries is also discussed.

B. Communication and fight against online propaganda: here also, sharing of experience are promoted, especially for counter-narratives. They state the possibility of creating a guideline for journalists to involve them into prevention of extremist discourses.

C. Multi-agency approaches: the challenge here is to enable collaboration between local actors and institutional actors on a higher level (regional, national, international). Once again, exchange of experiences is indicated to establish guidelines and local actions.

D. Sharing of knowledge: the focus is put on sharing informations, quantitatives and empirical data, and researches about “radicalisation” and the definition of this phenomenon.
E. Ideology and polarisation: the exchange of experience is once again mentioned with regard to the work with communities on the role of ideology.

F. Identify and address the risk of “radicalisation”: the objective is to identify experiences and good practices in terms of identification of risks. Reinforcing coordination between social, judicial and educatives structures. The question of implementing formations for field workers has also been raised.

G. Education and social inclusion: the main concern here is to help first-line workers to navigate between all of the possible practices and to be able to get funded.

H. External dimension: the question of a future cooperation and assistance with third countries is addressed.

**ISDEP**

ISDEP (Improving Security Through Democratic Participation) aims to develop training resources and create training hubs in each member state to equip first-line practitioners within institutions whose staff are more susceptible to encounter the first signs of violent extremism and violent "radicalisation". The training resources developed in this area is aimed at practitioners within 4 different key work sector areas: Non government Organisations/Voluntary sector, Education, Prisons/Probation and for Law Enforcement Agencies.

These are the objectives of the ISDEP:

- Provide EU wide leadership in sharing effective and consistent tactics to combat all forms of "radicalisation" through engagement strategies with communities and key stakeholders, which do not exclude specific communities.
- Demonstrate effective civil society and community engagement, providing understanding of the vulnerabilities and drivers that lead to extremism.
- Foster and enhance communication between key stakeholder agencies and communities leading to continuous improvement and strengthening of counter "radicalisation" measures.
- Strengthen and enhance existing networks to implement proactive engagement activities for information sharing and the promotion of good practice.
- Collate existing research / analysis about "radicalisation" to share current practices and improve performance by developing further tools and resources.

**CoPPRa**

CoPPRa is a project funded by the European Union with co-funding from the Belgian Federal Police, which aims to improve the capacity of first-line police officers to prevent “radicalisation”. It rests on the assumption that regular first-line police officers – community police officers – have an important role to play in preventing “radicalisation”; working in the field, understanding their local communities, and tending to have good community links. However, such police officers do not always have a good understanding of “radicalisation”, how to recognize the warning signs, or understand what to do in response. This project aims to plug those gaps through the spread of knowledge and training.
VERA-2

The Violent Extremism Risk Assessment, version 2-Revised (VERA-2R), is specifically designed, via the structured professional judgment (SPJ) approach, to analyse the risk of violent extremism. To develop effective policies and approaches, to obtain information on the likelihood of violent extremist action in prison and to develop an understanding in how to intervene in this process, the VERA instrument was developed by D. Elaine Pressman, Associate Fellow at the International Centre for Counter Terrorism in The Hague. The most recent revision, the VERA-2R, was published in 2016, after empirical use, feedback from international experts, and with supplemented data on mental health related indicators as well as risk promoting and risk mitigating indicators.

The programme includes the assessment of risk and threat elements of the broad spectrum of violent extremists, relevant for right-wing, left-wing, political separatists, jihadism and other political, social, or religious ideological extremism.

VERA-2R contains 34 indicators specifically related to violent extremism. They are divided between five domains: Beliefs, attitudes and ideology; Social context and intention; History, action and capacity; Commitment and motivation; and Protective / risk-mitigating indicators.

There are 31 additional indicators based on the scientific literature about general violence, radicalisation, jihadism and terrorism. They are divided between five domains: Criminal history; Personal history; Radicalization, Personality traits; and Psychiatric characteristics.

The assessor should use all objective information available in rating the indicators. Each VERA-2R indicator has criteria for three levels of rating (low, medium, high), consistent with other SPJ risk-analysis instruments. For reasons of standardisation, the user must carefully read and apply the operationalisations for each of the three risk levels. The final professional judgment is based on the weighting of all available information and data related to the risk indicators. The final decision is not made based on a numerical overall score.