BRAIN-be

Belgian Research Action through Interdisciplinary Networks

2012-2017

PUMOMIG

Public opinion, mobilisations and policies concerning asylum seekers and refugees in anti-immigrants times (Europe and Belgium)

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Contract - BR/175/A5/PUMOMIG

FINAL REPORT

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The present report has to be considered as a summary of the PUMOMIG research, and its original structure has been reduced. An in-depth discussion of PUMOMIG's theoretical perspective and state of the art, research objectives, methodologies and scientific results is provided in the Open Access research book: *The Refugee Reception Crisis in Europe: Polarized Opinions and Mobilizations*. For more details on the research and findings, please download the research book at: <http://www.oapen.org/search?identifier=1005529>.

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ABSTRACT

EN:

The refugee question occupied centre stage at every political debate in Europe since 2015. Starting from the "long summer of migration", the polarization of opinions and attitudes towards asylum seekers among citizens of the European Union has grown increasingly. The divergence between hospitality and hostility has become evident in political reactions as well. In this context, PUMOMIG pursued three main objectives. First, it examined public opinion towards asylum seekers and refugees through a quantitative cross-national perspective (WP1). Second, it analysed the polarization of public opinion by focusing on pro- and anti-migrant mobilization. This research step includes quantitative and qualitative methods and consists of an investigation of the opinions and practices of hospitality and hostility towards asylum seekers in local communities, as well as the collective reaction to the presence of newcomers in some European cities (WP2/3). This analysis allowed for an understanding of the links between public opinion, citizens' initiatives, and the implementation of asylum and reception policies. The third objective was to ethnographically analyse asylum seekers' and refugees' own perceptions of receiving countries and their asylum systems (WP4). These issues are specifically debated in the Belgian case. In the context of these different analytical dimensions, PUMOMIG also provided a qualitative evaluation of migration and asylum policies in Belgium (WP5)
Belgium represents the main case study (WP3/4/5), while the other national case studies (for WP2) have been chosen based on preliminary research on the policy system, public opinion, and geopolitical position. The selection focused on: relative tolerance towards asylum seekers and refugees in the policy system/public opinion (Germany and Sweden); strong opposition (Hungary); geopolitical position as a main arrival/transit country (Greece and Italy).

FR:

La question des réfugiés occupe une place centrale dans les débats politiques en Europe depuis 2015. Depuis le "long été des migrations", la polarisation des opinions et des attitudes à l'égard des demandeurs d'asile parmi les citoyens de l'Union européenne s'est accrue. Les divergences entre d'une part, l'hospitalité et d'autre part, l'hostilité se sont également manifestées dans les réactions du monde politique. Dans ce contexte, le projet PUMOMIG a poursuivi trois objectifs principaux. Premièrement, le projet a examiné l'opinion publique à l'égard des demandeurs d'asile et des réfugiés dans une perspective quantitative transnationale (WP1). Deuxièmement, le projet a analysé la polarisation de l'opinion publique en mettant l'accent sur les mobilisations en faveur et contre les migrations. Cette étape de la recherche est basée sur des méthodes quantitatives et qualitatives et consiste en une enquête sur les opinions et pratiques d'hospitalité et d'hostilité envers les demandeurs d'asile dans les communautés locales, ainsi que sur la réaction collective à la présence de nouveaux arrivants dans certaines villes européennes (WP2/3). Cette analyse a permis de comprendre les liens entre l'opinion publique, les initiatives citoyennes et la mise en œuvre de politiques d'asile et d'accueil. Le troisième objectif du projet était d'analyser ethnographiquement les perceptions des demandeurs d'asile et des réfugiés (WP4) des pays d'accueil et des systèmes d'asile. Ces dernières questions sont spécifiquement abordées dans le cas belge. Dans le contexte de ces différentes dimensions analytiques, PUMOMIG a également fourni une évaluation qualitative des politiques de migration et d'asile en Belgique (WP5).
La Belgique représente la principale étude de cas (WP3/4/5). Les autres études de cas nationales (WP2) ont été choisies sur la base de recherches préliminaires sur le système politique, l'opinion publique et la position géopolitique des pays étudiés. La sélection a porté sur: la tolérance à l'égard des demandeurs d'asile et des réfugiés dans le système politique/opinion publique (Allemagne et

Suède); la forte opposition (Hongrie); la position géopolitique en tant que principal pays d'arrivée/de transit (Grèce et Italie).

<u>*NL:*</u>

Het vluchtelingenvraagstuk stond centraal in elk politiek debat in Europa vanaf 2015. Sinds de "lange zomer van migratie" is er een steeds groeiende polarisatie in meningen en houdingen ten opzichte van asielzoekers onder de burgers van de Europese Unie. De divergentie tussen gastvrijheid en vijandigheid is daarnaast ook duidelijk geworden in verscheidene politieke reacties. In deze context streefde PUMOMIG drie hoofddoelstellingen na. In de eerste plaats werd de publieke opinie ten aanzien van asielzoekers en vluchtelingen onderzocht vanuit een kwantitatief cross-nationaal perspectief (WP1). Ten tweede analyseerde het project de polarisatie van publieke opinie door zich te focussen op de mobilisatie zowel voor als tegen migranten. Deze stap in het onderzoek omvat kwantitatieve en kwalitatieve methoden en bestaat uit een analyse van de opvattingen en handelingen van gastvrijheid en vijandigheid ten opzichte van asielzoekers in lokale gemeenschappen, alsook van de collectieve reactie op de aanwezigheid van nieuwkomers in bepaalde Europese steden (WP2/3). Deze analyse maakte het mogelijk om inzicht te verschaffen in de verbanden tussen publieke opinie, burgerinitiatieven en de implementatie van het asiel- en opvangbeleid. De derde doelstelling omvatte het etnografisch analyseren van de eigen perceptie van asielzoekers en vluchtelingen over de gastlanden en hun asielstelsels (WP4). Deze vraagstukken worden specifiek besproken voor het Belgische voorbeeld. In het kader van deze verschillende analytische dimensies heeft PUMOMIG ook een kwalitatieve evaluatie van het migratie- en asielbeleid in België uitgevoerd (WP5).

België is de voornaamste casestudy (WP3/4/5). De andere nationale casestudy's (voor WP2) werden gekozen op basis van voorbereidend onderzoek naar het beleidssysteem, de publieke opinie en de geopolitieke positie. De selectie focuste op: relatieve tolerantie ten opzichte van asielzoekers en vluchtelingen in het beleidssysteem/de publieke opinie (Duitsland en Zweden); sterke oppositie (Hongarije); geopolitieke positie als een belangrijk aankomst/transitland (Griekenland en Italië).

1. PROJECT DESCRIPTION

1.1 Introduction

PUMOMIG is based on the work of a research team comprised of doctoral and postdoctoral researchers and research directors from three Belgian universities - including Université Libre de Bruxelles (leader), Katholieke Universiteit Leuven (partner), and Université de Liège (partner), and national rapporteurs from five European countries - including Germany, Sweden, Hungary, Greece, and Italy. The research is divided in a preliminary quantitative analysis at the European level (WP1) and following national case studies approached through mixed methodology. Belgium represented the main case study (WP3/4/5) and the other national case studies (WP2) were chosen based on preliminary research on the policy system, public opinion, and geopolitical position. The selection focused on: relative tolerance towards asylum seekers and refugees in the policy system/public opinion (Germany and Sweden); strong opposition (Hungary); geopolitical position as a main arrival/transit country (Greece and Italy).

PUMOMIG's Work Packages

European dimension	WP1 PUBLIC OPINION TOWARDS NEW IMMIGRATION FLOWS IN
	WP2 COMPARISON OF FIVE EUROPEAN COUNTRIES (SW, DE, IT, GR, HU)
Belgian dimension	WP3 DISCOURSES AND MOBILIZATIONS PRO/AGAINST REFUGEES AND AS
	WP4 DISCOURSES AND MOBILIZATIONS OF REFUGEES AND AS
	WP5 POLICY EVALUATION

PUMOMIG's Research Team

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	Germany	Sophie Hinger (Osnabrück University), Priska Daphi and Verena Stern (Bielefeld University)
	Sweden	Pieter Bevelander and Enders Hellström (Malmö University)

The research team conducted field research from February 2017 to February 2019. Research activities included a European cross-national comparative analysis of public opinion and qualitative analysis of mobilization in all the involved countries. In Belgium, further research was undertaken into practices and discourses concerning asylum seekers and refugees, as well as their point of view about the reception system and its actors.

The national rapporteurs from five European countries were given specific templates in order to produce their chapters/reports. The templates included three main sections. Section 1 focused on migration flows before, during, and after the 2015 reception crisis, relevant political environment, and relevant pre-existing citizens' initiatives. Section 2 focused on relevant citizens' initiatives that emerged from the reception crisis of 2015 (focusing on actors, networks, practices and their relationships with the political and NGO environment). Section 3 focused on the consequences of mobilization on the political environment, on the politicization of the migration/refugee issue, and on the reaction of formal political parties.

1.2 Polarized opinions and mobilizations in a "reception crisis"

In the media and in political debates, and sometimes even in scientific output (Krzyżanowski et al. 2018; d'Haenens et al. 2019; Bets and Collier 2017), the long summer of migration was referred to as a "refugee crisis" or as the "European migrant crisis". We argue that it was rather and above all a "refugee reception crisis". The qualification of "refugee crisis" essentially hinges on the abundant use of superlatives, particularly in the press, to describe the "unprecedented human mobility"[1] of 2015. Even experts in the field of refugee studies could not escape making such apocalyptic

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[1] IOM, *World Migration Report*, 2015, <http://publications.iom.int/system/files/wmr2015_en.pdf>, accessed July 5, 2019.

statements (Bets and Collier 2017). The media witnessed a surge in the use of terminology that elevated these events into the realm of the exceptional, mobilizing the media rhetoric of the "*jamais vu*" [never before seen] (Bourdieu 1997). For instance, the media made repeated claims that Germany would be hosting one million asylum seekers.

The assessment of the extent of this exodus corresponded to the specific agendas of the institutions producing the information: the media on the one hand and international institutions on the other. News outlets competed with one another to capture readers, listeners and viewers with gripping images and powerful numbers. International institutions such as Frontex, UNHCR, IOM and Eurostat all provided different data that kept count of different units and givens. Frontex counted the number of illegal border crossings within the EU; UNHCR the number of migrants and refugees arriving by country; the IOM the numbers of those who died in the Mediterranean; while Eurostat kept track of the number of asylum seekers registered within the EU.

Though the exceptional nature of the migration of 2015 cannot be denied, the estimated figures provided by the media and by international institutions contributed to the creation of a moral panic (Cohen 1972). A study commissioned by the UNHCR analysing the press coverage of this exodus demonstrates the role played by the media in the framing of the long summer of migration. While a preponderance of humanitarian themes appeared in the national press, the data and the way it was mobilized contributed to framing the exodus of 2015 as a threat, especially in countries where the media is extremely polarized, such as in the United Kingdom.[2] The definition of the exiles as a threat was reinforced by the usage of categories such as "illegal immigrant".

According to data published by Eurostat in 2019, the EU received 1.3 million applications for international protection in 2015, and 1.2 million in 2016. After the agreement between the EU and Turkey, the number of asylum seekers dropped drastically in 2017 to around 700,000.[3] Given the profuse claims of the exceptional nature of events, it must be noted that the reception of just over 1 million asylum seekers represents only 0.2 per cent of the entire population of the EU. In this regard, the EU states demonstrated their eurocentrism by refusing to acknowledge the burden that the reception of asylum seekers, particularly Syrians, was having on neighbouring countries, particularly Turkey and Lebanon. In Europe, four states (Germany, Hungary, Sweden and Austria) together received around two thirds of the EU's total number of asylum applications in 2015. However, if the numbers are tallied in proportion to each country's total population, the countries that received the most asylum seekers are Hungary, Sweden, Austria, Finland and Germany. Countries with long histories of receiving asylum seekers took in numbers well below the European average, including the Netherlands, France and the United Kingdom.

How to explain the formation of anti-immigration sentiments among Europeans? There are at least four factors that can be identified to explain why the current social and political contexts are unfavourable to immigration. Firstly, while Europe has mainly experienced commodified and labour immigration, the reception of asylum seekers implies that the state may be temporarily suspending

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[2] UNHCR, *Press Coverage of the Refugee and Migrant Crisis in the EU: A Content Analysis of Five European Countries*, <https://www.unhcr.org/56bb369c9.pdf>, accessed July 5, 2019.
[3] Eurostat, *Asylum applications (non-EU) in the EU-28 Member States, 2008–2018*, 2019, <https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/Asylum_statistics>, accessed September 12, 2019.

the selection mechanism of acceptable immigrants as per the "guest worker" model. Secondly, the sudden and mass arrival of so many asylum seekers, as in 2015, 2000 and 1991, introduces a disruption of the regular arrival of new migrants (those who come for family reunification purposes, as workers, students or asylum seekers) and increases the overall visibility of migration, which then attracts the hostility of far-right parties. Thirdly, the increased visibility of migration is also a consequence of the policy of closing the borders of the EU and the construction of the irregularization of migration (Jansen et al. 2016), that is, the construction of "Fortress Europe". The increase in "remote control" measures (Zolberg 2006; Bigo 1996; Guiraudon 2002) that seek to control access to new territories even before travellers have left their countries of origin means that migrants are relying more frequently on smugglers and the migration industry (Gammeltoft-Hansen and Nyberg Sørensen 2011) and taking routes that are more and more dangerous, which also consequently makes them more and more visible. Fourthly, public opinion is becoming increasingly unwelcoming of migrants or any victims of war and persecution. To all of these we can add the five conditions of European discontent in 2015 identified by Lucassen (2018) following a historical perspective: the discomfort with the integration of migrants coming from North Africa and Turkey (1970s), the growth of social inequality (1980s), the fear of Islam (1990s), the rise of the radical right (2000s) and Islamist terrorism (2000s).

Since the beginning of the 2000s, the problematisation of international migration and the reinforcement of EU external borders, in the context of the global financial crisis, have increased the polarization between anti-immigration and pro-immigration attitudes and opinions in Europe (Lahav, 2004). According to DiMaggio et al. (1996), public opinion polarization includes two features: dispersion and bimodality. "Public opinion on an issue can be characterized as polarized to the extent that opinions are diverse" (DiMaggio et al., 1996: 694). However, diversity of opinions is not enough to identify polarization, as it needs to be also characterized by bimodality: "public opinion is also polarized insofar as people with different positions on an issue cluster into separate camps, with locations between the two modal positions sparsely occupied" (DiMaggio et al., 1996: 694).

In a study entitled *How the World Views Migration*, carried out by Gallup (Esipova et al. 2015) at the behest of the International Organization for Migration, research revealed that across the regions of the world – with the notable exception of Europe – people tended to want levels of immigration in their countries to either remain the same or increase from present levels. European citizens had the most negative attitudes towards immigration; with 52 per cent of those surveyed saying that they thought immigration levels should decrease. Nevertheless, opinions, even within Europe, were mixed. The regions that wished to see lower immigration rates were Southern Europe (58 per cent), and Eastern and Northern Europe (56 per cent). Citizens of Greece (84 per cent) and Italy (76 per cent) showed the greatest desire to see immigration levels decrease; they were also the countries that were most confronted with the reception of newcomers. Citizens of the UK (Northern Europe) also polled as hostile to rising immigration rates (69 per cent). People in Western Europe (including France, Germany and Benelux) were more willing to accept the current rate of immigration, at 45 per cent, while 36 per cent wanted to see it decrease.

The inaccurate perception of the actual numbers of migrants is one of the reasons behind negative public opinion. As reported in the IOM's 2011 *World Migration Report*, in a study of eight migrant-receiving countries, researchers (Transatlantic Trends 2010: 6) found that respondents were inclined to significantly overestimate the size of the migrant population. Surveys showed that in the United

States the public believed that immigrants made up 39 per cent of the population in 2010, far from the actual 14 per cent they represent. The same distortion of perception versus reality was found in a number of European countries as well: in France, 34 per cent versus 8 per cent; in Italy, 25 per cent versus 7 per cent; in the Netherlands, 26 per cent versus 11 per cent; and in Germany, 24 per cent versus 13 per cent. Gorodzeisky and Semyonov (2019) showed that overestimating the numbers of migrants had a negative impact on people's attitudes towards migrants and also heightened their concerns about immigration.

Research on public opinion reveals that anti-immigrant sentiment has increased throughout Europe over the last three decades (Semyonov et al. 2006; Meuleman et al. 2009). The European Commission's Eurobarometer 84 survey, published in November 2015, indicated that immigration, for the first time, had become the number one concern for Europeans (58 per cent). Negative perceptions towards non-European immigrants were most pronounced in Slovakia (86 per cent), Latvia (86 per cent), Hungary (82 per cent), the Czech Republic (81 per cent) and Estonia (81 per cent). Conversely, those countries that had the most positive perceptions of non-EU immigrants were Sweden (70 per cent), Spain (53 per cent) and Ireland (49 per cent). Eurobarometer 85 (2016) revealed that immigration was still the issue that concerned Europeans most, ahead of terrorism and the economic situation.

In the literature, some scholars have shown that individual factors are the most important when it comes to explaining people's attitudes – negative or positive – towards migrants. Multiple studies (Kleemans and Klugman 2009; Esipova et al. 2015; De Coninck et al. 2018) reveal that those with the lowest education levels, the lowest incomes, the highest perceptions of deprivation and highest levels of unemployment were those who tended to demonstrate more negative attitudes towards migrants. However, identifying the dependent variables in the creation of negative attitudes is not enough to understand how these variables work. The group conflict theory framework taken up by Van Hootegem and Meuleman in PUMOMIG provides an oft-substantiated claim (Quillian 1995; Meuleman et al. 2009). This theory holds that intergroup competition is the foundation of the construction of negative perception among ingroups, who feel threatened by outgroups – such as immigrants and ethnic minorities. Competition for goods, such as work or housing, leads native groups who are at the same economic level as new migrants to develop more negative attitudes towards the newcomers. For example, countries with higher rates of unemployment generally demonstrate more marked hostility towards immigration. If competition for jobs is one source of threat, the endangering of the welfare state is another. The Scandinavian countries with the most powerful welfare states (before they began deteriorating over the last two decades) witnessed the development of a welfare chauvinism (Andersen and Bjørklund 1990). Citizens saw new migrants as jeopardizing the welfare state by abusing it (Van Der Waal et al. 2010; Reeskens 2012). For this reason, people who had traditionally voted left began voting for far-right parties (Kietchell 1997) whose political agendas turned immigrants into the "new undeserving poor" of Western societies (Bommes and Geddes 2000). However, a comparison of the data collected by the European Social Survey in 2008–9 to that of 2016–17 (Heizmann et al. 2018) shows that welfare chauvinism did not increase after the long summer of migration.

In our research, Van Hootegem and Meuleman analysed the evolution of European perceptions towards immigrants since the beginning of the 2000s, demonstrating a relative stability of perceptions over time. The economic crisis of 2008–9 and the 2015 refugee reception crisis did not

create an overall trend towards a more negative climate of public opinion regarding immigration, asylum seekers and refugees. Still, their research confirms the existence of major national disparities in Europe, with a striking difference observed between the countries of Western and Northern Europe on one side, and the countries of Eastern Europe on the other. Since 2012, Eastern Europe has shown the most significant increase in terms of the perception of threat associated with immigration. Van Hootegem and Meuleman reveal that immigration is perceived as a threat for economic reasons, and because it endangers a sense of national identity and culture.

Research on the links between attitudes towards migrants and policy preferences over the last twenty years has led to a re-examination of the theory of social cleavage structures and how they manifest in European society. Historically, social cleavages are based on social class or ideological differences (Lipset and Rokkan 1967). In recent years, however, immigration, which divides societies into insiders and outsiders, people with or without immigrant backgrounds, has also become a source of social cleavage that not only polarizes public opinion but in fact crosses the boundaries of traditional cleavages (Kriesi et al. 2006; Van der Brug and van Spanje 2009). This polarization of both attitudes and practices, particularly the opposition between hostility and hospitality, was especially prevalent during the long summer of migration.

However, this polarization was already at work even before the arrival of asylum seekers during the summer of 2015. In Germany, the grassroots movement Refugees Welcome began its activities in November 2014,[4] and in 2015, it spread to other European countries: Austria, Greece, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, the Netherlands, Poland, Belgium and Italy. The movement was mainly concerned with the accommodation of asylum seekers, asking why refugees should not be able to live in flat-shares or private homes instead of closed centres. Through the use of Facebook, they facilitated accommodation for newcomers by matching people together. A study carried out by Berlin's Humboldt University and Oxford University (Karakayali and Kleist 2015) found that there was a 70 per cent increase in people volunteering for projects concerning refugees. The majority of the new volunteers were women, mostly between the ages of 20–30, with a high level of education and living in big cities. They cited the state's lack of action as the motivation behind their involvement.

However, not all citizens were so welcoming of the refugees. Also in Germany, in 2014, a far-right, anti-Islam organization called Pegida (Patriotic Europeans Against the Islamization of the Occident) was established, and the anti-migrant demonstration they called for in Dresden in January 2015 gathered more than 15,000 people. Pegida, with its mission to fight against immigration and denounce the "Islamization" of Germany, was not the only organization operating in Europe with such an agenda; similar groups popped up in a number of other European countries, such as Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Denmark, Spain, France, Italy, Norway, Poland, Switzerland and the UK (Berntzen and Weisskircher 2016). Though completely opposed both politically and ideologically, Refugees Welcome and Pegida made use of the same contemporary tools for collective mobilization (blogs, Facebook and Twitter).

Nevertheless, hostility towards refugees was less pronounced in the public sphere than acts of hospitality. During the long summer of migration, countless citizens used their own personal vehicles

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[4] See: #IamHuman, *Grassroots movements and the refugees: Refugees Welcome and PEGIDA*, 2016, <https://wpmu.mah.se/nmict161group1/2016/02/27/grassroots-movements-and-the-refugees-refugees-welcome-and-pegida/>, accessed July 5, 2019.

to shuttle refugees from Hungary to Germany, designed smartphone apps to provide train schedules or the location of the nearest hospitals, organized donation drives for clothing and medicine, distributed meals, and, above all, hosted refugees in their own homes (Crawley et al. 2017). Many studies have been carried out on the surge in acts of citizen solidarity with migrants during the long summer of migration by inscribing it in the perspective of the creation of a new social movement (Ataç et al. 2016; Römhild et al. 2017; Sutter and Youkhana 2017; Della Porta 2018; Feischmidt et al. 2019).

PUMOMIG brings an original contribution to this debate. It analyses, over time (2015–18), the practice of hospitality and solidarity towards refugees since 2015 by reconstructing the history of the social mobilization, collective action, networks and organizations, mobilized actors and political responses of that time period. This analysis also includes the actions and perceptions of asylum seekers themselves, specifically presented and discussed in the Belgian case. Some studies have shown that concrete situations engaging asylum seekers or undocumented migrants can lead to positive reactions and opinions based on emotion and compassion (Stattham and Geddes 2006; Ellerman 2006; Düvell 2007). This was most definitely the case during the long summer of migration. Ordinary citizens engaging in day-to-day activities came to witness first-hand the difficulties that asylum seekers were subjected to, whether in terms of administrative and institutional procedures, or the precarity of their social and sanitary conditions.

Some authors see acts of citizenship in these forms of mobilization (Isin 2008; Della Porta 2018), presupposing a politicization of both the actors and their actions. This potential evolution merits interrogation, because nothing, save for normative orientation, indicates that this is the only possible path. It is a perspective resulting from the literature on contentious politics, which considers that the political motives of mobilized actors are prerequisites for collective action. But the mobilization of a considerable number of volunteers and ordinary citizens during the long summer of migration is an entirely new phenomenon when compared to the usual forms of collective action carried out by traditional activists (NGOs, trade unions, No Borders activists, etc.) defending migrant rights. The moral and emotional motivations behind this action deserve to be examined without the creation of a schematic opposition between depoliticized humanitarian action on the one side and politicized acts of citizenship on the other (Vandevoordt and Verschraegen 2019). While civil society action often falls under Barnett's (2014) classic definition of "humanitarian aid" (with its tenets of impartiality, neutrality, independence and shared humanity), it would nevertheless be wrong to dismiss the meaning that Agier (2011) gave to "humanitarian government" and Fassin (2011) to "humanitarian reason", a modality of paying attention to suffering without providing answers in the form of law and justice.

The recent work that has been done on hospitality (Stavo-Debauge 2017) is a valuable contribution that helps us avoid falling into the trap of a reductive opposition between humanitarian action and political action. Acts of support for and welcoming of asylum seekers, in particular hosting them at home, are referred to under the general term of "hospitality", whereby the definition can vary from the limited concept of "humanitarian aid" (Barnett 2014) to the more expanded one of "cosmopolitan democracy" (Archibugi and Held 1995). The term "hospitality" was first used because the actions it references relate to fulfilling the immediate needs of asylum seekers, and because the motivations for the action are rooted in emotion and empathy towards asylum seekers (Berg and Fiddian-Qasmiyeh 2018). Volunteers and ordinary citizens did not initially mobilize in order to voice a

political demand for increased rights for migrants. However, the event of encounter (Deleixhe 2018) between ordinary citizens and asylum seekers might serve to politicize citizens. The organization, coordination and institutionalization of the movement can also contribute to the politicization of citizens who, since 2015, have been invested in acts of hospitality (Della Porta 2018). Finally, the actions undertaken might also be part of what Vandevoort and Verschraegen (2019) call "subversive humanitarianism", that is, morally motivated actions that acquire a political dimension because they are opposed to the government's political orientation. By analysing these acts of hospitality over time, PUMOMIG also discusses the possible structural modifications of the social movement to support migrant rights depending on the mobilized actors (civil society) and their proposed actions (hospitality).

In cities, actions of hospitality find space, social groups and opportunities to flourish, while at the same time fuelling fears and threats of social, ethnic and spatial segregation. As our researches show, the opportunity structures specific to each national context serve to either favour or limit how actions of hospitality, particularly those undertaken by civil society, are inscribed in time. Both spatial and local dimensions play a central role here (Glorious and Doomernik 2016; Bontemps et al. 2018). These dimensions might be at the root of the well-known NIMBY (not in my backyard) phenomenon, where migrants are associated with both social and cultural threat. In multi-level political regimes where local authorities possess significant autonomy, the disparity between national and local political orientations becomes a political opportunity for the increase in hospitality actions towards refugees. This is particularly apparent in the United States with the development of sanctuary cities (Ridgley 2013), but also in Germany and Belgium.

The first common element across the different country cases is the fact that the long summer of migration has had an evident impact on civil society in Europe. Regardless of the geopolitical situation of each case, whether they are first arrival, transit or destination countries, a large and diversified set of attitudes and practices emerged, became more or less systematic and structured, and ultimately questioned the relationship between politics and citizens. Only in rare instances did citizen's reactions indeed align with political stances. In most instances, mobilization concerning the inflow of migrants seeking asylum has taken the shape of demonstrations against political decisions or the government's position on the migration issue. Whether negative or positive, intended to reject or welcome newcomers, the actions taken by citizens made visible their dissatisfaction and criticism towards the way their political elites and institutions attempted to manage the situation. Overall, if opinions remained relatively stable before and during the 2015 refugee reception crisis, as mentioned above, civil society mobilization increased in all the countries studied, showing specific characteristics in terms of the typology and motivation of the actors involved, the practices put in place, the issues represented, the relationship of mobilized groups with the network of existing organizations and institutions, their structures and profiles, their evolution and transformation over time, and their outcomes.

Concerning the typology of actors involved in the mobilization, one common element to all cases is the participation of individuals without previous experience of active support to asylum seekers, migration-related issues, or even any form of mobilization. This element is integral to the fact that the summer of 2015 marked an unprecedented solidarity wave in Europe, with some cases like Germany standing out with half to two thirds of the population taking action to assist newcomers during the peak of the reception crisis, as highlighted by the German rapporteurs Hinger, Daphi and

Stern in their contribution. Another interesting point is that mobilization, both positive and negative, is generally localized in urban settings, with the exception of certain particularly problematic concentration areas such as the Serbian/Croatian border in Hungary, or the Greek islands hit by mass arrivals. Citizens with a migration background were also active in support activities in Germany, Belgium and Sweden in particular.

Positive mobilization springs from a range of motivations that are relatively stable in all the contexts studied here. Firstly, it is politically driven as it embraces the problem of formal access to rights (Monforte and Dufour 2011), including issues of citizenship and recognition of undocumented people, but also more generalized political elements such as demands for civil/human rights and anti-capitalism. Mobilization linked to this order of motivations is also aimed at having a direct impact on national politics, on the policymaking process and on the implementation of field practices, including in those contexts where institutions show relative "openness" towards asylum seekers. Citizens often have the objective of correcting – or more precisely, suggesting corrections to – state policies, and they mobilize accordingly, such as in the case of the struggles for the regularization of "*sans-papiers*" in Belgium. Mobilized citizens and civil society collectives also direct their activities towards reforming field practices, including a lack of local communication from institutional actors to citizens in locations with a high concentration of asylum seekers, low-quality reception practices and the management of reception structures.

The political element characterizes negative citizen mobilization only in those contexts where strong far-right groups already existed before 2015. The aforementioned Pegida movement in Germany, the Greek far-right party Golden Dawn and various anti-immigrant paramilitary groups in Hungary are all examples in this category. Although they mostly carried out violent attacks and actions, this kind of negative mobilization only bears the clear purpose of changing state policies in the case of Germany, where the government's approach was particularly inclusive, at least in the initial period of the reception crisis. In other contexts, and particularly in Hungary as noted by the national rapporteurs, negative mobilization appears to be consistent with state policies. It structures itself as a strategy to integrate field practices aimed at controlling access when the reception system is clearly no longer effective, and even close to collapse. In the case of Italy, furthermore, negative mobilization is always political, but it is only driven by citizen initiatives on rare occasions. As described by the Italian rapporteur Maurizio Ambrosini in his contribution, opposition to the arrival of asylum seekers in Italy comes mostly from local governments themselves, and it only rarely involves the spontaneous mobilization of citizens.

Secondly, mobilization is driven by motivations connected to specific socio-cultural beliefs. On the one hand, positive mobilization such as participation in volunteer activities is driven by the principle of "humanitarian solidarity". As noted above, this principle is often identified as a key element in the social dynamics of the refugee reception crisis (see for example Della Porta 2018; Krasteva et al. 2019). PUMOMIG demonstrates that this kind of motivation does not only dominate positive mobilization in those countries characterized by a positive philosophy of reception and a relatively open approach to migration and diversity (for example, the "*Willkommenskultur*" in Germany or the "exceptionalism" of Sweden). Solidarity is largely the strongest catalyst for collective and individual pro-refugee mobilization, and has an evident impact on practices, particularly in the initial period of the long summer of migration. Donations and emergency help such as the distribution of food and clothes are indeed the most common practices among volunteers and civil society groups involved in

support activities. This is also true in those contexts where public opinion is more critical of migration, where institutions take a more restrictive approach, and even in countries like Hungary where civil society is traditionally not very proactive (Milan 2019). As highlighted in existing scholarship, solidarity engagement, especially within the different aspects of migration, often conveys a political message or motivation (Mezzadra 2010), can become an act of demonstration (Walters 2008), and can often take the shape of a "governmental norm" (Fassin 2007). The analyses proposed in PUMOMIG are no exception. However, the cases of civil society groups and individual citizens involved in humanitarian solidarity mobilization presented here do not show an explicit political stance. On the contrary, they operate independently from political groups, at least at the beginning of their involvement between 2015 and 2016. They are not generally influenced by formal political groups, although in some cases like Greece and Italy they count militant members of radical left-wing, anarchist and anti-capitalist circles among their participants. Significantly, these trends can be seen as consistent with citizen's critical perspective on institutions highlighted above, in a time of growing scepticism from citizens towards formal political representation.

On the other hand, negative mobilization may also be seen as motivated by socio-cultural beliefs. In this sense, the organizations and citizens who mobilized against the reception and accommodation of asylum seekers share a perspective inspired by the traditional discourse about the demographic threat of the Global South, including tropes such as ethnic substitution, opposition to "foreignization" and more generally an exclusivist conception of the national community. Van Hootegem and Meuleman explain how the perception of cultural threats revolving around national identity, norms and values has significantly increased, especially in Eastern and Southern Europe, during the reception crisis period. Differently from humanitarian solidarity, however, the socio-cultural beliefs embedded in negative mobilization are directly represented by formal political parties or movements. Theodoros Fouskas, national rapporteur for the Greek case, highlights how a process of enhancement of the nation state based on the differentiation between citizens and migrants gives way to manifestations and violent episodes of intolerance. Similarly, Maurizio Ambrosini notes that the principles motivating negative reactions such as the conception of the national territory as "private property", or the envisaging of the national community as the victim of an invasion, are all represented by the anti-immigration party, the Lega, and its leader Matteo Salvini, and are key elements in the recent repositioning of the party rhetoric and agenda along an anti-migrant, ultra-nationalistic stance (Mandin and Mazzola 2016). The Hungarian case, even more explicitly, shows that xenophobic social beliefs are completely integrated into the policy system and the actions and decisions of the Orbán government. Aspects of these tropes, however, especially if connected to material concerns such as threats to the labour market, the welfare system or institutional structures, have generally been absorbed by all political parties and have gained consensus in the bipartisan political debate in Northern Europe as well. This even happens in countries such as Germany and Sweden, which are perceived to bear a more progressive approach to the migration issue.

Whether driven by political or socio-cultural motivations, positive mobilization seems to have both a collective and an individual dimension. On the other hand, negative mobilization is almost never individual. PUMOMIG's evidences and ethnographic sources, in the Belgium case in particular, show how support for asylum seekers often springs from the individual will to act and contribute. On the negative side, this kind of personal dynamic is not observed. It must be noted that positive engagement is much more widespread, present and regular in the cases studied here, although

negative actions are often more visible and mediatized, but are short-lived and only occasional. Acts of violent protest are limited in number, but are relatively recurrent in those contexts where far-right groups are stronger and more structured. In any case, both positive and negative forms of mobilization mostly pertain to the creation, activation, consolidation, interaction and evolution of groups and networks, and thus it is the collective dimension that remains central to our focus.

The 2015 reception crisis led to the emergence of important civil society organizations, collective citizen initiatives and networks. As discussed in recent scholarship, these groups have strongly affected the relationship between civil and state actors (see for example Verschraegen and Vandevoordt 2019). Starting from the long summer of migration, mobilization has occurred through new groups and structures, but also through dormant organizations that reactivated and existing organizations that changed their mission, embracing the issue of asylum seekers and refugees. The nature of their activities and their principles changed over time; they adapted to the changes in the migration situation, the needs of newcomers and the policy structures surrounding them. The studies in PUMOMIG look at three specific dimensions. Firstly, the focus is on the typology of organizations and interactions within the network of different collective actors active in the reception of asylum seekers. Secondly, they look at the interaction between civil society groups (both formal and non-formal organizations), state actors and structures of governance. Thirdly, they include views on the outcomes of civil society collective mobilization, and the reception crisis as an example of political momentum.

As mentioned above, the typology of organizations involved ranges from new collectives to previously existing groups that reactivated or changed their activities. Concerning these latter groups, not all countries (such as Greece and Hungary, as we will see) could rely on a strong pre-existing landscape of organizations. In Germany, a large part of the support is provided by organizations that are not directly connected to the migration issue, often set up or driven by people with a migration background. Specific established networks always play an important role in the stimulation of citizen participation in support activities. In Italy and Sweden, as we will see, religious organizations and their networks of volunteers activated immediately. Not only did they share information and promote awareness-raising campaigns, they also emerged as first-line actors in the reception of asylum seekers and the resolution of refugee-related tensions in the public debate.

Concerning the first point on the interaction within networks of mobilized organizations, our cases show several interesting elements. Although examples of horizontal cooperation are observed, some of the research reveals forms of conflict between organizations, generated by a lack of coordination and mutual acknowledgement, above all between subjects with different profiles. In particular, informal volunteer groups often clashed with official volunteer organizations. Conflict is observed in the Belgian case, where civil society organizations implemented activities in parallel to the Red Cross, that is, the state-designated actor for managing reception practices. The situation seems to be completely different in Greece, where pro-migrant civil society groups coordinated through a voluntary open assembly. Bevelander and Hellström, national rapporteurs for Sweden, point out that informal and formal organizations not only cooperated but often merged, and characterize this condition as necessary for the support activity to exist and remain stable.

Secondly, the interaction between civil and state actors and structures is an aspect that deserves much attention. This is because the reception crisis represents a key moment in which civil society

has reacted more or less explicitly to the problems, gaps and failures of political institutions and institutional policy measures. In doing so, citizen organizations and NGOs made visible the "organized non-responsibility" (Pries 2018) that characterized the approach of the EU, and the indifference of many European countries during the reception crisis. To begin with, it is important to note that mobilized actors in civil society often changed their motivations and adapted their scope during the reception crisis. In general, groups motivated by solidarity embraced political demands and also shifted to politically driven mobilization, showing that the two categories described above are not exclusive or confrontational, but rather overlapping. This is due to two main factors that are common to all the cases observed. First, participation in solidarity activity lowered over time. Second, several non-formal organizations started to take on a structured form, to professionalize their activity and, in some cases, to politicize it. In Germany, for example, the huge popular participation in support activities at the start of the crisis did not last long. However, support organizations took on a professional profile and were able to keep on running their activities. Similarly, in Belgium, participation decreased but forms of spontaneous solidarity engagement turned into formal organizations characterized by political engagement, shaping specific frames of mobilization towards a form of "political solidarity".

The relationship between civil society and local or national institutions is not only something that occurred in the field as a consequence of spontaneous engagement. To varying extents, all the country cases demonstrate that forms of cooperation with civil society actors were not only expected but also fostered by governments, following a multi-actor governance principle (Van Heffen et al. 2000). The Protection System for Asylum Seekers and Refugees (SPRAR) in Italy, for example, is structured around the principle that local governments should rely on civil society organizations to manage the access of asylum seekers to the protection system. In other contexts, non-governmental actors are officially designated to manage reception practices, such as in the case of the Belgian Red Cross. As well as cooperation, however, civil society groups and institutions often engaged in open conflict at the local and national level. With regard to the creation and progressive politicization of migration-oriented volunteer organizations in Hungary, which were increasingly critical of the Orbán leadership, the government reacted with specific measures to oppose and limit their activities, such as the creation of an unfavourable tax regime for NGOs, emblematically labelled "Stop Soros".

Concerning the third focus of analysis, interesting elements emerge in our researches regarding the outcomes of civil mobilization and, more generally, the political consequences of the 2015 reception crisis. On the one hand, volunteer groups, local citizen initiatives and civil society organizations supporting reception paved the way for inclusive approaches towards asylum seekers and migration in general. These approaches are characterized by their local dimension, involving specific regions, areas or municipalities, and by opposition (of varying strength) to restrictive state approaches. They are consistent with the establishment of new paradigms of integration, a trend that recent scholarship has observed to be growing in European local contexts (Geddes and Scholten 2015; Glorius and Doomernik 2016), and they bring about a "local turn" in the management of the contemporary migration issue (Ahouga 2017; Zapata-Barrero et al. 2017). All the cases of positive mobilization presented in PUMOMIG confirm that civil society made concrete efforts to correct, integrate or oppose state policies and field practices.

The crisis in the system of reception across Europe opened what Bevelander and Hellström define here as a "window of opportunity" for citizens not only to mobilize, but also to transform spontaneous collective mobilization into concrete action and to have an impact on political structures and on public opinion. This is true for both positive and negative forms of mobilization. In several instances in Belgium and Germany, mobilized groups of citizens working alongside the state-designated reception actors took on a formal structure and became involved in the decision-making process at the local level. In Germany, however, a strong representation of anti-migration views emerged in 2015, reflecting significant polarization in society. The crisis also allowed far-right groups to over-represent the asylum issue as a primary national threat, and to gain space in the public debate. In the Greek context, as noted by Fouskas, Golden Dawn had a strong impact on the way a widespread idea of Greece as a xenophobic country has been shaped at the national and international level. Similarly, in Italy, the reception crisis has represented an opportunity for different segments of the right-wing and far-right spectrum to coordinate and gather together, with Matteo Salvini taking on the political leadership. In turn, the growth of anti-migration parties along the right-wing spectrum stimulated sporadic but violent actions against asylum seekers and, more importantly, enabled these actions to become tolerated and accepted by public opinion.

2. DISSEMINATION AND VALORISATION

- *Main Scientific Dissemination*

International Conference (project final conference): "Public opinion and forms of mobilization concerning asylum seekers and refugees in anti-immigrant times. Global challenges and local solutions". Brussels, October 24-25, 2019.

On Day 1 (24/10/2019), the conference gathered scholars and researchers in the field of migration and asylum, including PUMOMIG's Belgian research team and international partners (presenters: Andrea REA, Marco MARTINIELLO, Bart MEULEMAN, Alessandro MAZZOLA, Arno VAN HOOTEGEM, Elsa MESCOLI, Antoine ROBLAIN, Marije REIDSMA, Maurizio AMBROSINI, Anders HELLSTROM, Pieter BEVELANDER, Theodoros FOUSKAS and Sophie HINGER). Four external experts also joined the programme (Sarah MAZOUZ, Moritz BAUMGÄRTEL, Tihomir SABCHEV, Robin VANDEVOORDT). PUMOMIG findings constituted the core of the debate. The research book "The refugee reception crisis in Europe. Polarized opinions and mobilizations" has been presented during the conference.

On day 2 (25/10/2019), the conference gathered scholars in the field of migration and asylum, members of local governments, Civil Society Organizations, and EU actors, with the aim to open debate on alternative localized practices and solutions in the management of the refugee issue and the reception of asylum seekers in Europe. Participants discussed in three roundtables:

1. *Civil society organizations and citizens' initiatives*
   What is the role of local Civil Society Organizations? Do they have an impact on the different levels of governance on matters concerning reception and integration policies? Do citizens' initiatives set up formal organizations and structures to participate in the reception and integration of asylum seekers? The roundtable gathered field actors and representative members of organizations, collectives and platforms who will present their experiences of solidarity and reception. The aim was to highlight their relationship with political authority, citizens and migrants in their localities.

   Moderator:
   Koen DEWULF (Myria)

Participants:
France ARETS (CRACPE)
Adriana COSTA SANTOS (BXLRefugee)
Marie-Dominique DREYSSE (ANVITA)
Eef HEYLIGHEN (Vluchtelingenwerk VL)
Carine THIBAUT (CNCD 11.11.11)

2. *Political authorities and institutions*
   What is the role of local political institutions and actors? What is the impact of local political trends and discourses on the decision- and policy-making processes at the national and EU level? What is their impact on the implementation of practices and the development of alternative solutions by civil society actors? The roundtable gathered local politicians and policy makers with the aim to share and discuss localized experiences of management of refugees and asylum seekers, highlighting cooperation and conflicts with regional, national and supranational governments, as well as with the civil society in their jurisdiction.

   Moderator:
   Andrea REA (ULB)

   Participants:
   Lieven DEHANDSCHUTTER (City of St-Niklaas)
   Julie FERNANDEZ FERNANDEZ (City of Liège)
   Lefteris PAPAGIANNAKIS (City of Athens)
   Nathalie PERRIN-GILBERT (City of Lyon)

3. *EU actors and organizations*
   What can EU actors do to stimulate the dialogue between different levels of governance? How can they contribute to the development of policies and strategies aimed at creating a favourable environment for local governments and actors to develop and implement solutions to the refugee issue? The roundtable will gather representatives of EU organizations and international NGOs active in the migration and asylum domain. The aim is to stimulate debate on possible shifts in EU policy-making and legislation towards the local dimension of governance in European cities in order to support locally-driven, durable and sustainable strategies to manage the refugee issue.

   Moderator:
   Tom NAEGELS

   Participants:
   Geertrui LANNEAU (IOM)
   Bernhard PERCHINIG (ICMPD)
   Shannon PFOHMAN (CARITAS Europa)
   Pierre VERBEEREN (Médecins du Monde)

   - *Other Scientific Dissemination (selected)*

Invited conference (full scientific organisation). FEDASIL G-100 Conference and 2020 New Year Reception, Brussels, January 9, 2020. With: Andrea REA, Marco MARTINIELLO, Alessandro MAZZOLA, Elsa MESCOLI, Antoine ROBLAIN, Arno VAN HOOTEGEM, Annie HONDEGHEM, Elien DIELS.

Presentations:

The reception of refugees in Belgium: from one crisis to another
Andrea REA (ULB) and Marco MARTINIELLO (ULg/FNRS)

Reception policies for asylum seekers and refugees in Belgium: dynamics in decision making

Annie HONDEGHEM and Elien DIELS (KULeuven)

Belgian citizens' opinions towards immigration and asylum policies: Flanders and Wallonia compared
Arno VAN HOOTEGEM and Bart MEULEMAN (KULeuven)

The reception (and integration) of refugees in Belgium: networks of actors and relations
Elsa MESCOLI (ULg)

The Belgian reception system and practices. What do migrants think?
Alessandro MAZZOLA and Antoine ROBLAIN (ULB)

Full project panel: "The refugee reception crisis in anti-immigrant times. Polarization of the public opinion, local mobilizations and reception practices in Europe". Panel Chairs Marco MARTINIELLO and Alessandro MAZZOLA. IMISCOE 2019 Annual Conference, Malmö, June 26-28, 2019. With: Marco MARTINIELLO, Alessandro MAZZOLA, Sophie HINGER, Marije REIDSMA, ELien DIELS, Arno VAN HOOTEGEM, Maurizio AMBROSINI, Anders HELLSTROM, Pieter BEVELANDER.

Full project panel: "Public opinion and forms of mobilisation concerning asylum seekers and refugees in anti-immigrants times". Panel Chairs Andrea REA and Alessandro MAZZOLA. ECPR General Conference 2019, Wrocław, September 4-7, 2019. With: Andrea REA, Alessandro MAZZOLA, Arno VAN HOOTEGEM, Anders HELLSTROM, Verena STERN, Theodoros FOUSKAS and Elien DIELS.

Forms of mobilization for the reception and integration of asylum seekers. Ethnographies from two cases in Wallonia, French-speaking Belgium. Paper presented by Alessandro MAZZOLA at: 7th Ethnography and Qualitative Research Conference, Bergamo, 6-9 June 2018.

Repas métissés. Negotiating identity and participation through culinary practices by undocumented migrants in Liege. Paper presented by Elsa MESCOLI at 20th Cambridge Heritage Symposium, Cooking Identities & Tasting Memories: The Heritage of Food, Cambridge, 10-11 May 2019.

Bonheur de dire, malheur de taire. Speaking out through art by undocumented migrants in Liege (Belgium). Paper presented by Elsa MESCOLI at: EASA Conference, Stockholm, 14-17 August 2018.

Multi-level governance of asylum seeker and refugee's integration: examples from Belgium. Paper presented by Alessandro MAZZOLA and Shannon DAMERY at: ECPR General Confernce, Hambourg, 22-25 August 2018.

Qui a droit à l'aide sociale ? Représentations de l'ordre social et attitudes de la part de bénéficiaires du CPAS envers les réfugiés. Paper presented by Antoine ROBLAIN at: Immigration et politiques publiques des différences, Montréal (Ca), 28 October 2017.

De demandeurs d'asile à migrants irréguliers de passage : Les limites de l'hospitalité envers les mobilités africaines en « transit » à Bruxelles. Paper presented by Antoine ROBLAIN at: Dakar (Senegal), 10 January 2018.

On the impact of cultural projects in the discursive normalization and integration of refugees in Belgium's public opinion and society. Paper presented by Alessandro MAZZOLA at: International Sociological Association (ISA) Conference, Toronto (CA), 15-21 July 2018.

Attitudes towards immigrants and refugees: A comparison of settlement and non-settlement countries. Paper presented by Bart MEULEMAN and Arno VAN HOOTEGEM at: ESS-workshop "Samenhang in Europa: eenheid in verscheidenheid", Den Haag, the Netherlands.

Refugee Integration and Refugee Integration Policies in the EU: Ambiguities and Perspectives. Key-Note Address by Marco MARTINIELLO at: Project TREE (Training for integrating Refugees in Euregio), VHS Achen, 25 June 2018.

Attitudes towards asylum policies in a divided Europe: A multilevel analysis. Paper presented by Arno VAN HOOTEGEM, Bart MEULEMAN and Koen ABTS at the ECPR General Conference, Wroclaw, 04 Sep 2019-07 Sep 2019.

European citizens' opinions towards immigration and asylum policies. A quantitative comparative analysis. Paper presented by Arno VAN HOOTEGEM, and Bart MEULEMAN at IMISCOE, Malmö, 26 Jun 2019-28 Jun 2019.

Attitudes towards asylum policies in a divided Europe: A multilevel analysis. Paper presented by Van Hootegem, A., Meuleman, B., Abts, K. at the 4th International ESS Conference, Mannheim, 15 Apr 2019-17 Apr 2019.

Van Hootegem, A., Meuleman, B., Abts, K. (2018). Attitudes towards immigrants and refugees: A comparison of settlement and non-settlement countries.Presented at the ESS-workshop Samenhang in Europa: eenheid in verscheidenheid, Den Haag, 16 Mar 2018-16 Mar 2018.

3. PUBLICATIONS

- *Books (main)*

Rea, A., Martiniello, M., Mazzola, A., & Meuleman, B. (2019*). The Refugee Reception Crisis in Europe: Polarized Opinions and Mobilizations*. Brussels: Brussels University Press. Available in Open Access: <http://www.oapen.org/search?identifier=1005529>.

- *Scientific Articles (selected)*

Meuleman, B., Davidov, E., & Billiet, J. (2018). Modeling multiple-country repeated cross-sections:A societal growth curve model for studying the effect of the economic crisis on perceived ethnic threat. *Methods, data, analyses (mda)*.

Martiniello, M., & Mescoli, E. (2018). L'art pour exister, l'art d'exister. L'engagement artistique des nouveaux migrants. *Voix Solidaires*, 13, 11-13.

Billiet, J.,Abts, K., Galle, J., Meuleman, B., & Swyngedouw, M. (2017).Vijfentwintig jaar onderzoek naar de houding tegenover migranten in België.Verandering en stabiliteit in de periode 1991-2014. *Sociologos*, *38*(1-2), 3-19.

Van Hootegem, A., Meuleman, B., Abts, K. (2019). Van slachtoffer tot bedreiging? Attitudes ten aanzien van vluchtelingen in vestigings- en niet-vestigingslanden. In: S. André, G. Kraaykamp, R. Meuleman, M. Wittenberg (Eds.), *Samenhang in Europa: eenheid in verscheidenheid*, (11-38). DANS: Den Haag.

Martiniello, M. (full special issue in Open Access). Arts and Refugees: Multidisciplinary Perspectives, *Arts* 8(1).

Damery, S. & Mescoli E. (2019) (in Open Access). Harnessing visibility and invisibility through arts practices: Ethnographic case studies with migrant performers in Belgium, In Martiniello, M. (ed.). Arts and Refugees: Multidisciplinary Perspectives, *Arts* 8(1).

- *Other Publications*

Rea, A., Martiniello, M. (2019). "Contrairement aux idées reçues, l'accueil des réfugiés a suscité un élan citoyen en Europe". *The Conversation*, *10 octobre 2019*, *https://theconversation.com/contrairement-aux-idees-recues-laccueil-des-refugies-a-suscite-un-elan-citoyen-en-europe-122832* .

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De Coster S., onder leiding van Annie Hondeghem (2018). Report *Het besluitvormingsproces voor het opvangbeleid van asielzoekers in België* 2014-2018. KU Leuven.

4. ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

ANNEXES

[PUMOMIG_conf_brochure.pdf]: programme of the International Conference (project final conference): "Public opinion and forms of mobilization concerning asylum seekers and refugees in anti-immigrant times. Global challenges and local solutions". Brussels, October 24-25, 2019.
http://blogs.ulg.ac.be/arts-minorites/en/pumomig/

Research program financed by the Belgian Science Policy Office (BELSPO)
as part of Belgian Research Action Through Interdisciplinary Networks (BRAIN-be)

Public opinion and forms of mobilization concerning asylum seekers and refugees in anti-immigrant times

Global challenges and local solutions

International Conference & Book Presentation

24 and 25 October 2019

Royal Academy of Science, Letters and Fine Arts of Belgium
Place du Trône 4, Brussels